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Macgregor, Douglas A. Transformation under Fire:
Revolutionizing How America Fights. Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 320pp. $34.95

This book provides an exceptional look
at a complex subject—bringing the U.S.
Army into the twenty-first century.
Building on the themes presented in his
book Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century
(Praeger, 1997), Macgregor again calls
for the Army to leave behind, once and
for all, its “garrison” mentality and fully
embrace a joint expeditionary mindset.
He sees an army whose transformation
has bogged down because it chooses to
focus too narrowly on new technology
whose performance to date has fallen
short of expectations.
The value of this book is the constructive manner in which it describes how
the Army (like all services, for that matter) should transform from a Cold War
force to one that is capable of meeting
the nation’s requirements in the new
century. Macgregor provides a lucid
and well reasoned argument on what
is wrong with the Army’s current approach to transformation. He asks several simple but demanding questions:
Whom and where do we fight? How
should we fight? Most importantly,
what is the strategic purpose for the
Army in the future?
Macgregor makes clear that transformation must be more than wholesale replacement of current equipment using
new information and nanotechnologies.
Rather, what is needed, he insists, is
greater emphasis on developing fresh
ideas about how to restructure and reorganize the current force. Such change
must be made in conjunction with a
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rationally evolved plan that replaces
legacy equipment with tools that will
generate the desired combat effects
needed in the future. In his view, the
Army already has the skills and 90 percent of the technology and platforms it
needs; what is missing is a “joint organizational structure and combat leadership
philosophy” needed to exploit an effectsbased operational framework.
The current global war on terrorism, in
Macgregor’s view, provides the perfect
opportunity to change the Army. Yet
such transformation must not risk losing what is clearly the finest fighting
force in the world today. America’s current and future enemies are resourceful
and imaginative and will find ways to
obviate or mitigate current U.S. tactical
and strategic advantages, especially
where equipment and material are concerned. To meet these evolving challenges, Macgregor repeatedly
admonishes the Army to develop and
articulate a concept for joint maneuver
and land strike that embraces a joint
operational architecture.
Leveraging ideas presented in other forums, the author recommends that the
nation’s security planners begin developing military command and control
organizations that are regionally focused and structured to incorporate
land, air, and sea elements into a joint
architecture integrated with and subordinate to current regional combatant
commanders. To be effective their
forces must be capable of seamlessly
plugging into such regional command
and control arrangements. The Army in
particular, with its indigenous hierarchical and top-heavy command structure, is
ill suited to do so and must change if it is
to do its part in the joint fight.
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Throughout this work, Macgregor provides specific and concrete examples of
problems and solutions. He explains,
for instance, how the Army should
align itself in a joint architecture based
on combat maneuver groups composed
of light reconnaissance, airborne assault, aviation combat, and early deploying support. The purpose of such
groups is to integrate lean fighting units
with powerful strike assets that are not
only lethal in combat but have the necessary strategic agility to achieve rapid
decisive results. Lest the reader think
that Macgregor is a proponent of
smaller and lighter forces, he also
makes clear there can be no substitute
for superior firepower in any fight. In
examining the most recent U.S. combat
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Macgregor notes that the real challenge
of the close fight is that “the advantage
of information dominance diminishes
considerably”; “old-fashioned firepower delivered in mass” remains
essential.
The conclusion reminds us that the nature of warfare will continue to change
and that the need for transformation
will only grow in importance as our enemies adapt to our past successes. The
process of transformation, he points
out, however, is not the sole responsibility or purview of the Army—it requires the best civilian and military
minds. Macgregor’s effort goes a long
way toward furthering that thinking
and is a must read for those who wish
to enter the military transformation
debate.
RONALD RATCLIFF
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Karnad, Bharat. Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security. New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002. 724pp.
Rs795
Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul. India’s Maritime Security.
New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000. 208pp.
$42.64

Analysts and observers interested in
global security issues would do well to
pay closer attention to the always rich
debate in Indian security circles about
that country’s future national policies,
supporting budgets, and force structures. India is a rising power with a rapidly growing economy, an increasing
military budget, and in some key areas,
a newly enhanced national will to translate its potential into broader influence
on the world stage. These two books are
excellent examples of the national debate on how India should use its power
to protect and advance its growing national interests. Each covers specific
elements of India’s national security—
nuclear weapons and maritime security.
Bharat Karnad is an unabashed advocate of a robust Indian nuclear weapons
structure, doctrine, and policy. Karnad,
a national security policy analyst at an
Indian think tank, the Centre for Policy
Research in New Delhi, was a member
of the First National Security Advisor
Board to the National Security Council
of India. In that capacity, he was a
member of the Nuclear Doctrine
Drafting Group. In the wake of India’s
May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, the
group produced a draft nuclear doctrine that was submitted to the National
Security Council in August 1999. (After
significant delay, the essence of the doctrine was adopted formally in January
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